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surgical team had never performed this surgical procedure on a human being. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff LEA R. FICKLIN was suffering from a heart condition 
known as angina pectoris and was under the care of David P. Jahsman, M.D., 
an internal medicine specialist, who determined that it may be salutary for 
plaintiff to undergo a cardiopulmonary bypass procedure to relieve the symp-
toms of the angina condition. Plaintiff LEA R. FICKLIN was subsequently 
referred to the defendants for their consideration of performance of this 
operation on Mr. Ficklin. The defendants failed to inform the plaintiffs 
that this was the first operation of this kind that they had performed as a 
team on a human being and of the material risks that the plaintiffs were 
assuming by undergoing this procedure. Subsequent to the operation, plain-
tiff LEA R. FICKLIN sustained extreme central nervous system deficits including 
partial paralysis, legal blindness, loss of memory and impairment of his other 
mental facilties. As a consequence of these impairments, plaintiff MARGARET 
R. FICKLIN, was required to permanently terminate her gainful employment to 
provide care for her husband, plaintiff LEA R. FICKLIN. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT SURGEONS HAD A LEGAL DUTY TO FULLY INFORM THE 
PLAINTIFFS OF ALL THE MATERIAL RISKS INVOLVED IN THIS SURGICAL PROCEDURE. 
Although plaintiffs consented to an operation for the implan-
tation of a vein from the leg and between the aorta and the arteries of the 
heart ( tr. 37) they would not have consented to the procedure had the doctors 
informed them of the material risks that they were assuming by consenting to 
this operation (tr. 14, 15, 46, 47, 48). 
The legal duty of a physician to disclose all material risks 
is well established. In Salgo v. Stanford, 154 Cal. App. 2d. at 578, the 
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California Court stated: 
"A physician violates his duty to his patient 
and subjects himself to liability if he with-
holds any facts which are necessary to form 
the basis of an intelligent consent by the 
patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise, 
the physician may not minimize the known dan-
gers of a procedure or operation in order to 
induce his patient to consent." 
When alleging a lack of informed consent, the patient need not 
show that the operation per se was the proximate cause of any injury that de-
veloped, for the issue is not that the procedure was performed unsatisfactorily, 
but that it was performed at all. Therefore, the plaintiff need only show that 
he would not have submitted to the operation or treatment if he had been fully 
advised of the risk which resulted in the injury. 
This problem is closely allied with whether the plaintiff will 
have to establish through expert testimony whether or not it was standard med-
ical practice in his community for a physician to disclose more about the 
nature and effects of a proposed operation or treatment than was disclosed 
to him. Many courts have held that such expert testimony is required, but 
some recent widely cited cases disagree. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d. 
722; Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P. 2d. 1; Fogal v. Genesee Hospital, 344 N.Y.S. 2d. 
552. 
Since Canterbury v. Spence, supra, is the first major signi-
ficant departure from this rule and expands the scope of tort liability for 
failure to get informed consent, a close scrutiny of this case is required. 
The case concerned a laminectomy in the thoracic spine. A myelograph showed 
a filling defect at the fourth thoracic vertebra. The surgeon advised an 
operation for a suspected ruptured disc. When asked about the danger, he 
said the operation was not more dangerous "than any other operation." 
The laminectomy showed a swollen cord that couldn't pulsate, 
an accumulation of large, tortuous and dilated veins and a complete absence 
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of epidural fat. On the first postoperative day, the patient's condition 
was good. That night he fell from his bed as he was trying to void, unas-
sisted by hospital personnel. Shortly afterwards, paralysis set in. The 
surgeon performed a reoperation and created a gusset to give the cord more 
space to pulsate. 
At the trial, the physician testified, when called as a wit-
ness for the plaintiff, that no one knew what caused the paralysis but that 
trauma could cause it, and he further stated that the risk of such paralysis 
was but one percent, i.e., a very slight possibility, and to disclose it to 
a patient would be bad medical practice as it might deter him from undergoing 
needed surgery and could provoke adverse psychological reactions which could 
preclude the success of the operation. He was the only medical expert called 
and, at the close of the entire case, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's 
cause of action. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
granted a new trial and in a lengthy opinion, set forth the following stan-
d ards relevant to the instant case, to-wit: 
"The physician had a duty to disclose the risk even if only a 
one percent chance of paralysis existed. 
It is a root premise of American jurisprudence that every 
human being has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body. 
The very dependence of a patient upon the physician requires 
a disclosure of all foreseeable potential dangers. 
What must be disclosed is not to be gauged by medical stan-
dards but rather by standards set by law which must be imposed by the courts 
upon physicians. 
No expert testimony is needed as to what the physician should 
have informed the patient of. 
The scope of disclosure is measured by the patient's need to 
know. Therefore, all risks material to an intelligent decision must be known. 
The law must set a standard for adequate disclosure; the physi-
cian's duty to disclose must be determined by foresight, not hindsight; the 
fact-finder must find, in order to impose liability, that the physician's 
communication to the patient was "unreasonably inadequate." 
-4-
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An objective standard is established, i.e., a risk is deemed 
material, when a reasonable person with due regard for the patient's position 
would be likely to attach significance to the risk in deciding whether to 
accept or to forego therapy. Thus, even a very small chance of death, or of 
a disability which would dramatically outweigh the potential benefit of ther-
apy, requires disclosure. 
Whether the patient would have consented or not is an objective 
test to be decided by the reasonably prudent man standard, so that physicians 
are not victimized by the patient's hindsight. 
No expert testimony is required to show the materiality of a 
risk or to show the effect of disclosure or nondisclosure." 
In a 1974 Oregon Supreme Court decision the Court stated: 
"For purposes of the requirement that the physician 
must inform patient of all material risks involved 
in certain courses of treatment, a risk is material 
when a reasonable person,in what the physician knows 
or should know to be the patient's position,would be 
likely to attach significance to the risks or cluster 
of risks in deciding whether or not to undergo the 
proposed therapy." 
Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 522 P. 2d. 208 (Ore. 1974). 
The duty of a physician to inform the patient is a fiduciary 
duty. 
The relationship between the physician and his patient is one 
of trust calling for a recognition by the physician of the ignorance and help-
lessness of the patient regarding the patient's own physical condition. 
A patient is entitled to rely upon his physician to tell the 
patient what he needs to know about the condition of his own body, and physi-
cian must supply the patient with material facts that the patient will need in 
order to intelligently chart his destiny with dignity. 
The elements of the cause of action based upon the "informed 
consent doctrine" include the existence of the material risk unknown to the 
patient, the failure to disclose it, assuring that the patient would have 
chosen a different course if the risk had been discloses, and resulting injury. 
The physician has a duty to disclose to the patient the material 
risks of a medical procedure as a matter of law (emphasis added), and testimony 
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of medical experts is not necessary to establish the duty to disclose that which 
the law requires. 
When a reasonable person in the position of a patient probably 
would attach significance to a special risk in deciding on course of treatment, 
such a risk is material and must be disclosed to patient by the physician. 
Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P. 2d. 852 (Wash. App. 1974). 
The plaintiff need not show that the operation per se was the 
proximate cause of any injury that developed, for the issue is not that the 
procedure was performed unsatisfactorily, but that it was performed at all. 
Therefore, the plaintiff need only show that he would not have submitted to 
the operation or treatment if he had been fully advised of the risk which re-
sulted in the injury. Salgo v. Stanford, supra. 
The Washington Court in the case of ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital 
Medical Center, 499 P. 2d. 1, 81 Wash. 2d. 12, 52 A.L.R. 3d. 1067 defines "in-
formed consent" as follows: 
"The name for a general principle of law that a 
physician has a duty to disclose what a reason-
ably prudent physician in the medical community 
in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose 
to his patient as to whatever grave risks of in-
jury might be incurred from a proposed course of 
treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary 
care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice 
of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alterna-
tive treatment, or none at all, may intelligently 
exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the 
probable risks against the probable benefits." 
Also see Annotation A.L.R. 3rd. 1067. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court defines "informed consent" as "a 
principle that eyery person has a right to determine what shall be done with 
his own body and therefore, in situations where medical treatment involves 
grave risks of collateral injury even if performed in a nonnegligent manner, 
law imposes a duty upon physicians to inform the patient of options avail-
-6-
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able and risks attendant upon each so patient can make an informed exercise of 
choice. 
Duty imposed upon physician to inform patient as to risks of 
a course of treatment extends to inherent and potential hazards of treatment, 
alternatives, and results likely if patient remains untreated but has no ap-
plication to hazards of improper procedure." Martin v. Stratton, 515 P. 2d. 
1366 (Okla. 1973). 
Applying the sister state's definitions of informed consent 
and in view of the testimony given by these plaintiffs at the trial, it is 
evident that a question of fact that should have been considered by the jury 
was improperly withheld from the trier of fact by the trial judge. 
Even if the risk of this result occurring was as small as one 
percent (tr. 85) the defendants still had a duty to disclose it to the plain-
tiffs. In the case of Coopers v. Roberts, 286 A. 2d. 647 (Pa. 1971) the plain-
tiff signed a blanket consent form for performance of a gastroscopic examin-
ation (diagnostic procedure). The doctor assured the patient that the pro-
cedure was a simple one and that there should not be any trouble. The 
physician had done the procedure 250 times with no mishap. The possibility 
of injury was only .0004%. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania court found for 
the patient holding that the medical community practice bears no relationship 
to the standard to measure the amount of knowledge a patient neeas to make an 
informed consent. The Cooper court further held that "as the patient must 
bear the expense, pain, and suffering of any injury from medical treatment, 
his right to know all material facts pertaining to the proposed treatment 
cannot be dependent upon self-imposed standards of the medical profession." 
The doctor owes a duty to his patient to make reasonable dis-
closure of all significant facts. Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W. 2d. 11, 
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14 (Mo. 1960). Some courts have held that the fiducial qualities of the 
(physicians-patient) relationship imposes a duty to reveal to the patient 
that which is in his best interest that he should know. Emmett v. Eastern 
Dispensory and Casualty Hospital, 396 F. 2d. 931 (D.C. App. 1967), Mason v. 
Ellsworth, 474 P. 2d. 909 (Wash. 1970). Every man has a right " to forgo 
treatment or even cure if it entails what for him are intolerable consequences 
or risks, however warped or perverted his sense of values may be in the eyes 
of the medical profession, or even the community, so long as any distortion 
falls short of what the law regards as incompetency." Note Restructuring 
Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 Yale 
L. J. 1533, 1565 (1970). See also Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. University 
Board of Trustees, 317 P. 2d. 170 (Cal. 1957). The scope of the physician's 
communication to the patient must be measured by the patient's need and that 
need is the information material to the decision. Canterbury v. Spence, supra, 
at 786-87. The result was foreseeable (tr. 67, 68) and the plaintiffs had a right 
to know it. In Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A. 2d. 676 (R.I. 1972) the court 
stated that "informed consent" imposes a duty upon a doctor which is com-
pletely separate and distinct from his responsibility to skillfully diagnose 
and treat the patient's ills. The patient's right to make up his own mind should 
not be delegated to a local medical group many of whom have no idea as to his 
(the patient) informational needs. 
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the trial court 
should have allowed the issues of fact as to whether or not the defendant doc-
tors had failed to adequately inform their patient regarding the material risk 
of permanent injury and that they breached their duty to the plaintiffs in 
failing to inform them that they had never previously performed this operation 
as a team upon a human being. The law must safeguard the undisputed right of 
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the patient to receive information which will enable him to make a choice either 
to take his chances with the treatment, by whom rendered ,or to risk living without 
it. 
POINT II. 
THE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING WHAT IS A MATERIAL RISK IS A LEGAL, 
NOT A MEDICAL QUESTION, TO BE DETERMINED BY AN OBJECTIVE TEST. 
What the doctor must disclose to his patient is not to be gauged 
by medical standards but rather by standards set by law which must be imposed by 
the courts upon physicians. No expert testimony is needed as to what the physi-
cian should have informed the plaintiffs of. Whether the patient would have con-
sented or not is an objective test to be decided by the reasonably prudent man 
standard. Canterbury v. Spence, supra. Furthermore, the physician has a duty 
to disclose to the patient the material risks of a medical procedure as a matter 
of law, and testimony of medical experts is not necessary to establish the duty to 
disclose that which the law requires. When a reasonable person in the position of 
a patient probably would attach significance to a special risk in deciding on 
course of treatment, such a risk is material and must be disclosed to patient by 
physician. Miller v. Kennedy, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred in failing 
to allow the jury as the trier of fact to determine whether or not the defendant 
surgeons had complied with the legal standard of disclosure to the plaintiffs in 
divulging sufficient information to them to enable them to exercise their discretion 
to give an "informed consent" or pursue other alternatives which were reasonably 
available to them. These factual questions were properly considerable in light of 
the circumstances of the case by the jury that was empaneled for this purpose. 
-9-
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Therefore, this honorable Court should reverse the judgment of 
the District Court and remand the case to it for further proceedings. 
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